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Not Quite a Full House:
The Case for Enlarging
the House of Representatives
Brian Frederick

For almost a century the United States House of
Representatives has consisted of 435 members. This
seemingly permanent fixture of American politics often
obscures the reality that during the first century of the
country’s existence the House was increased almost
every ten years after its original size of 65
members was established. Increasing the
size of the House was once a representational imperative in order to offset the
growth in the nation’s population.
However, after the last increase that
occurred in 1911 members concluded that
the House could no longer operate efficiently if the size of its membership continued on an upward trajectory. The
major consequence of refusing to increase
the size of the body is that the average
number of citizens each House member
represents has risen dramatically in the
subsequent decades. While the House has
remained constant in size for nearly 100
years the nation’s population has grown by more than
200 percent to over three million people. When the
results of the next Census are revealed, House members
will represent on average more than 700,000 people per
district. As a point of comparison, at the time of the
nation’s founding, the corresponding figure was 30,000
citizens. In light of these developments, political commentators across the ideological spectrum have raised
serious questions about whether the House can retain
its representative character if the present 435-seat limit
remains in place as population growth continue to
spiral upward.
In my new book Congressional Representation and
Constituents: the Case for Increasing the Size of the
House of Representatives, I investigate this issue with
an unprecedented empirical examination of how the
sharp escalation in the average constituency size has
influenced the quality of representation its members
provide. A careful review of this evidence shows that
the representational character of the House has been
undermined by the cap that was placed on its membership. Members who represent larger constituencies are
on average, less responsive and less accessible to their
constituents. Based on this diminished state of repre-

sentation I argue that it is now time for the House to be
immediately increased to 675 seats and to undergo
decennial increases following the census to accommodate population growth. Implementing this change
would lead to better representation in three ways. It
would: make it easier for House members to remain in touch with their constituents, improve the policy responsiveness of House members and provide
better descriptive representation for
historically underrepresented demographic groups in what is an increasingly
diverse country. Significantly increasing
its size would move closer toward fulfilling the ideal that the U.S. House is truly
the people’s House.
Why do I support 675 seats as the appropriate size of the House? The original
decision to impose a limit of 435 seats
was made in an arbitrarily fashion without the consideration of any empirical
criteria. However, there is a more systematic method to
determine the appropriate size of the House. In most
advanced democracies, the lower house of the national
legislature approximates the cube root of the nation’s
population. Comparative legislative analysts have classified this empirical pattern as the cube root law of
national assembly size. There is a rationale that undergirds this empirical regularity. All legislative bodies
must balance the trade-off of the need to operate efficiently while providing effective representation to the
citizens in their districts. Legislators need to communicate with their fellow members and stay in touch with
their constituents. The cube root law projects that the
optimal assembly size is determined by the number of
seats relative to the ratio of citizens per district that will
accommodate these competing demands. Legislatures
are not designed to expand in a limitless fashion or in
direct proportion to the population because to do so
would undermine the capacity to legislate effectively.
The size of a legislature tends to increase in line with
the growth of the population in a country, but at a
lower rate. However, if the average number of constituents in a district becomes too large, the legislator will be
unable to communicate effectively with constituents.
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Figure 1-1: Average Population per
Representative for the U.S. House from 1790–2000
Figure 1-1 Average Population Per Representative for the U.S. House from 1790-2000
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During the first century of the nation’s history the U.S.
House conformed rather well to cube root law of national assembly size.
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The cube root law provides the most rational formula
for balancing the trade-offs involved in determining the
size of any legislative body. Not only would it bring the
House into alignment with international legislative
norms, it would also help restore some balance on the
representative side of the ledger between the competing
imperatives of representation and legislative efficiency.
The House would be well served to return to the policy
of increases every ten years linked to the cube root of
the population. Passing such a law would mean that
following the 2010 census the House should be increased to approximately 675 members, the projected
cube root of the U.S. population in that year.

adequate job of staying in touch with the people in the
district. Moreover, serving additional constituents also
increases the probability that the representative will be
disapproved of by the people in their districts. Future
increases in the ratio of citizens per representative are
likely to aggravate the discontent citizens feel toward
their elected representatives in the U.S. House.
As predicted by the cube root law of national assembly
size, the failure to increase the size of the House to
accommodate dramatic population growth has interfered with channels of communication between representatives and their constituents. A continued refusal to
adjust the size of the chamber as the population continues to expand will further strain the connection
between citizens and their representatives. Returning
to the practice of decennial increases in the size of the
House tied to the cube root of the nation’s population
would enable representatives to be more accessible to
citizens and would help citizens feel more connected to
their representatives.
In addition to increasing constituent access to their
representatives, a larger House would facilitate better
policy representation. Many scholars have argued that
as constituencies become larger the probability that a
representative will reflect constituency opinion in the
district declines. The research presented in my book
documents that this dynamic is present for the U.S.
House as well. When I analyzed the voting patterns of
House members at various levels of district population
size, I found that a larger constituency creates more
policy divergence between constituents and their representatives than would otherwise be the case. The presence of a considerable number of additional citizens in
the district has the effect of pushing representatives
farther away from the views of their constituents. The
result is a voting record that tends to gravitate toward
the activist base of party supporters in the district and
veers farther away from the median voter than would
be the case in a smaller constituency. This outcome was
forecasted by critics of the 435-seat limit at the time it
was established and appears to have come to fruition.
Although the available evidence does not indicate that
constituency size is the only variable that leads to divergence between the issue positions of constituents and
their representatives, it does offer support for the proposition that larger constituencies diminish policy
representation.

An ideologically diverse group of advocates calling for
an increase in the size of the House, in including liberals
like U.S. Rep. Alcee Hastings of Florida and conservatives like columnist George Will, have argued that it
would make it easier for representatives to stay in touch
with their constituents. Although senators from more
populous states tend to be less accessible and less popular than senators from less populated states, until recently there was not much evidence to show that such a
relationship exists in House districts. However, in my
book I demonstrate that House members who represent
larger constituencies also confront a similar challenge in
trying to remain in touch with the citizens in their
district. Looking at survey data I found that as constituency size increases, citizens are less likely to report
having contact with their representative and having
met their representative in person. The evidence also
indicates that citizens are less likely to make an attempt Increasing the size of the of the House to account for
to initiate contact with their representative in larger
population growth in line with the cube root law of
districts.
national assembly size is far from the only solution for
remedying the lack of responsiveness of House memNot only is contact between citizens and their represenbers to their constituents’ policy views, but it would
tatives undermined by a larger constituency, but so are
certainly make a contribution toward bridging the
citizens’ perceptions of legislative responsiveness.
divide that presently exists. If the average House district
Citizens living in the most heavily populated congrespopulation size continues to expand, the prospect for
sional districts are less likely to believe their representagreater divergence between constituency preferences
tive would be helpful should the need to contact them
and policy responsiveness will be heightened. Since the
arise. The same relationship applies when citizens are
questioned about whether their representative does an

larger the size of a district’s population the less likely
representatives are to reflect opinions of the majority of
their constituents, in smaller, more ideologically cohesive constituencies it will be easier for House members
to reflect the policy preferences of the people they
represent.

underrepresented groups into the House. A larger body
would open up opportunities for women and minorities
to serve, resulting in greater numbers of citizens who
feel that they have someone in the House of
Representatives to look out for their interests.

Even critics of increasing the size of the House concede
that some benefits would accrue from a larger House.
They maintain, however, that these benefits are not
worth the costs. From their perspective an increase
would be too costly, undermine legislative efficiency
and diminish the quality of debate in the body. In the
book I acknowledge that although many of the critics’
concerns are valid, none of them rise to the level that
would outweigh the positive impact on representation a
larger House would produce. In short, I contend that
any additional costs to the treasury would be a fraction
of the total federal budget, the legislative process would
not become more inefficient as long as the institutional
rules are structured
properly and that the
that the composition of a legislative body ought to
reflect the demographic makeup of society. This form of overall quality of deliberation on legislation
representation matters because members of certain
would not be reduced.
groups may pursue policies that are in the interests of
those groups in the policy-making process. Furthermore,
As someone who studit may allow for unarticulated interests to be heard in
ied the Congress closely
the deliberative process and may give members of
for many years I am
groups, such as women and minorities, who have been
under no illusions that
systematically excluded from full participation in polia change of this magnitics, the chance to demonstrate their ability to particitude is on the horizon
pate effectively in the governing process. This country
in the current political
is far more diverse than it was when the 435-seat limit
environment. In the
was originally imposed. A House consisting of over two
final analysis, a United States House of Representatives
hundred additional members would better accommoconsisting of close to 435 members seems likely to
date the vast ethnic and racial diversity that currently
remain a permanent fixture of the political system for
exists in the United States.
years to come. Increasing the size of the House may
carry tangible benefits for representation, but the odds
Most House members get elected not by defeating an
that it will ever occur in the foreseeable future are slim.
incumbent but by winning a seat that becomes open
Nevertheless, for the U.S. House to genuinely live up to
either through retirement, resignation, or death. There
its status as the institution in the federal government
is a greater likelihood that women will emerge victoriclosest to the people, it ultimately must be a larger
ous in open-seat races. Women have typically made
substantial gains in the first election following reappor- House and continue to grow as the nation’s population
grows. A failure to do so would be contrary to the repretionment when more seats are open. Under my propossentative character this institution is supposed to emal, after each census the number of new seats apporbody. Even though I concede the prospects for an intioned would rise, creating additional opportunities for
crease seem bleak at this juncture, that does not mean it
women and minorities to run successfully for the
should be discounted as policy option that is off the
House. For African Americans and Latinos, less poputable for serious consideration from national policymaklated congressional districts would make it easier to
ers. The fact that a policy option is not likely to gain
create majority-minority districts that would be likely
any traction does not make it any less worthy of being
to elect members of these underrepresented groups.
adopted. Political realities should not be allowed to
According to survey data presented in my book, women derail an increase in the size of the House that is so
and African Americans are highly supportive of increas- desperately needed to enhance the representativeness of
ing the size of the House of Representatives for this
what is supposed to be the people’s House.
purpose. Doing so could enhance minorities’ sense of
—Brian Frederick is Assistant Professor of Political Science.
political trust and efficacy and strengthen the bonds
they feel with their elected representatives. The present
435-seat figure impedes the entrance of members of
Another significant benefit of enlarging the size of the
House is that it would improve descriptive representation. The concept of descriptive representation holds
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